Abstract: Wireless vehicular communication is used to enhance tra c safety and to minimize congestion, thereby leading to increased driving e ciency. A malicious node can transmit an inaccurate message to trigger inevitable situations by pretending to be multiple (other) vehicles. Therefore, it is critical to identify malicious nodes as well as fake messages generated by such nodes, and discard such messages quickly. In a Sybil attack, an attacker participates in the network with multiple forged identities in order to disrupt the fundamental operations of VANET. Sybil attacks are particularly easy to launch in VANETs due to the open and broadcast nature of communication medium. In this paper, we present the implementation of simulated Sybil attack scenario in VANET and its consequences on the performance of the network. We also propose a lightweight, scalable and distributed detection approach based on the di erence in movement patterns of Sybil nodes and legitimate nodes. In our approach, each Road Side Unit (RSU) computes, stores and veri es various parameter values including RSS, distance, angle of passing-by vehicles through passive overhearing process to detect Sybil attackers. The combination of di erent parameters makes our detection approach highly accurate. We validate our results on realistic traces obtained from a multi-agent microscopic tra c simulator (MMTS). Simulation results show the e ectiveness of the proposed approach to locate Sybil nodes with a di erent number of network parameters.
Introduction
VANET is a special case of Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) and it features additional characteristics such as large scale, high mobility and frequent network fragmentation. It aims to improve vehicle safety by using Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to RSU (V2R) communication.
For example, in case of an accident, inter-vehicle communication can be used to warn other vehicles approaching the accident site, thereby giving drivers enough time to take appropriate safety measures [1] .
Typical VANET applications include collision avoidance, route changing, warning about dangerous road conditions, post-crash warnings, etc. The security of vehicular networks is still largely a un-evaluated area. Vehicular networks inherit all the security challenges faced by any wireless network. Security is indispensable because a poorly designed VANET is vulnerable to network attacks and this in turn can compromise driver safety. A security system should ensure that packet transmission from trusted sources should not be tampered en-route by other sources. Malicious nodes take advantage of the wireless communication environment to implement spoo ng attacks. In this attack, the attacker masquerades as another by falsifying data and thereby gaining an illegitimate advantage. As all communication is conducted over a shared broadcast channel and through periodical exchange of beacon packets, an attacker can claim multiple identities without being detected. In an unsecured network like VANET, identities of nodes can easily be falsi ed by malicious nodes, which presents an opportunity for a Sybil attack.
In a Sybil attack, an attacker forges its identity to masquerade as another node. In such a situation, an attacker can create multiple identities either by forging, stealing or by using any other means. Attackers can create an illusion of a non-existent event by transmitting fake messages using some or all of these identities at the same time. This attack is a root cause of all other forms of attacks in VANET.
Identity authentication infrastructure such as electronic license plate (ELP) [2] is implemented in VANET. Although, identity authentication prevents an attacker from unlimitedly fabricating fake identities, it alone can not help in preventing Sybil attacks in VANET. Application of authentication requires reliable key distribution, management and maintenance schemes. Cryptographic authenti-cation is not always possible because it requires infrastructural, computational and management overhead. Moreover, cryptographic schemes are susceptible to a serious problem, i.e node compromise attack because most VANET nodes are easily accessible. Malicious nodes can get additional identity information by non-technical means such as stealing or fabricating fake identities.
A malicious vehicle can disseminate false tra c information in order to force other vehicles and vehicular authorities to take incorrect decisions. For example, a Sybil attacker may present an illusion of 50 vehicles on a 500 meters road area by sending beacon packets using 50 different identities. In this delusion, a Sybil attacker can misuse safety related applications to clear the path for an aggressive driver to its destination by convincing other vehicles to slow down or speed up on the road. Sybil attacks have a serious impact to the normal operation of VANET applications. It is desirable to detect the presence of Sybil nodes and eliminate them from the network.
In this paper, we present an implementation of three categories of Sybil attacks based on type of communication, identity and their participation in the network. We evaluate the impact of these variants of Sybil attack on VANET performance. We propose a detection approach in which all nodes participate in the detection of any misbehavior in VANET. The proposed technique uses VANET properties such as prede ned mobility patterns of nodes (vehicles can move only on the road) and placement of some xed units on roadside(embedded in the tra c and road lights). Each node broadcasts beacon packets periodically to other nodes that are within its communication range. A beacon packet contains the transmitting node's identi cation number (ID), position and timestamp. In our detection approach, authorized RSUs periodically calculate the distance based on Received Signal Strength (RSS) and angle of vehicle sending the beacon packet with reference to authorized RSU. Each RSU compares and analyzes the di erence of in-range vehicles' movement trajectories. Since, all Sybil nodes generated by an attacker are bounded by the same physical location, they have the same values for these parameters. The proposed approach is able to locate Sybil nodes based on the di erence in these parameters and classify the nodes in different groups depending upon the number of malicious nodes creating the Sybil identities.
The proposed detection approach leverages the presence of RSUs at roadside locations. This may not be an unreasonable assumption because RSUs are present across most of the network and are trustworthy. The proposed approach reduces the computation time by limiting the detection process to RSU end only. This concept makes the proposed approach highly accurate and more e cient as it reduces the overall error rate. We have proved that due to mobility and connectivity of nodes in VANET, the proposed approach can produce a high detection accuracy. Specifically, the contributions of our paper are summarized as follows: -Elaborative description of di erent forms of Sybil attacks in the context of vehicular networks. -Implementation of these attacks in VANET scenario.
-Evaluation of the impact of these attacks on VANET performance. -Evaluation of proposed Sybil attack detection methodology in realistic scenarios. 
Related work
Raya and Hubaux [1] discuss a number of unique challenges in VANETs. They describe how adversaries use safety applications to create various attacks and lead to security issues. For example, malicious vehicles can convince other vehicles to slow down or speed up on the road for their own bene t. However, the authors have not analyzed how these attacks can be achieved and they do not provide solutions to address these security threats. Various types of attacks on an inter-vehicle communication system are presented in [2] . They analyze how an attacker can manipulate the input of an on board unit (OBU) and sensor readings. The authors proposed plausibility checks using constant system examinations but do not discuss how to apply plausibility checks in detail. Douceur [3] describes and formalizes Sybil attacks in the context of peer-to-peer networks. It can easily defeat reputation and threshold protocols intended to protect against it. In a distributed system such as VANET, most applications assume that each participating entity has exactly one identity. If this assumption is satis ed, there is no risk of identity spoo ng attacks. A central certi cate authority (CA) may be used to prevent these attacks. This authority guarantees that each entity has only a single identity. In practice, it is very di cult to deploy this scheme on a large scale. Levine et al. [5] have presented a survey of solutions to Sybil attack. Resource testing [4] is another method to defend against a Sybil attack. It is assumed that physical resources of each node are limited. Unfortunately, this method is not suitable [7] for Ad Hoc networks because an attacker can attain more resources than honest nodes. Radio resource testing [5] is also di cult to implement as an attacker in a VANET scenario can use multiple radio devices to evade the detection method.
Hesiri et al. [34] propose a position and velocity verication scheme for one hop neighbors. They simulate the proposed scheme in various vehicular mobility environments including rural, urban and Manhattan. They evaluate the proposed scheme for both position and velocity veri cations with automotive grade di erential global positioning system (DGPS). They introduce the errors in position and speed intentionally and evaluate results for rural, urban and manhattan scenarios.
Public key cryptography is proposed to solve the security problem of Sybil attacks in [2, 8] . The authors introduce the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) algorithms for VANETs. Mukhopadhyay et al. [9] propose a multi-factor authentication scheme where a certi cate is issued to all vehicles. This contains not only the public key information but also a set of physical attribute values, such as radio frequency ngerprint and transmitter coverage, of a vehicle recorded by CA. Deploying Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI) is a heavy and di cult solution that must be tested to assess its possible use in the real world due to VANET characteristics. Bouassida et al. [32] analyze the e ectiveness of a Sybil attack, under assumptions of transmission signal tuning and antenna, and demonstrate the limitation of RSS based Sybil attack detection in VANET.
Hubaux et al. [2] propose a veri able multilateration method to perform distance bounding mechanism. In this approach, two to three xed units (RSUs) are used to perform distance bounding. However, multilateration techniques are not suitable for vehicular networks because the number of nodes in the proximity are too few to perform multilateration.
Demirbas et al. [10] have presented a Sybil attack detection scheme for wireless sensor networks that uses multiple sensors for RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) measurements. However, the authors do not explain how to identify honest neighboring nodes. In their experiments, node positions are trusted and xed throughout the simulation. They prefer to record and compare the ratio of RSSI for the received messages. Through experiments, they conclude that the RSSI values uctuate signi cantly even for xed nodes. In their scheme, they use the RSSI ratio to overcome time variance. Only two collaborating detector nodes are su cient to detect a Sybil node. Therefore, cooperation of nodes is crucial for this scheme to be successful. This scheme can not be applied in situations where nodes are moving, untrusted or may collude in a hostile environment.
An approach to detect Sybil attack in a static wireless sensor network is proposed in [33] where information about neighboring nodes is used to detect Sybil attacks. However, it is not feasible to directly apply this scheme to detect attacks in VANET scenario because of its unique features such as high mobility of vehicles and frequent network fragmentation.
Piro et al. [11] have proposed a Sybil attack detection approach for MANETs. They assume that some mobile nodes are trustworthy. These nodes observe the tra c activities and periodically broadcast the observed tra c information. A core feature of MANET i.e. mobility is used to detect and identify nodes that are part of Sybil attack. Their scheme is based on the fact that legitimate nodes move independently while fake identities created by an attacker move together as they are bound to a single physical node. A secure hardware based method is proposed in [12] and is built on a trusted platform module (TPM). Secure information is stored in shielded locations of the module, where any type of forging or modi cation of data is impossible. Hence, communication between TPMs of the vehicles are protected from a Sybil attack. TPM is an improved variation of a certi cate. Still, it needs trusted authorities that can own responsibility of managing individual vehicles. Yan et al. have proposed a position veri cation approach in [13] . In this paper, it is assumed that global positioning system (GPS) devices are installed in each node. GPS position claimed by a sender is matched with the position estimated by the radar at receiver end.
Xiao et al. [14] have proposed a localized and distributed scheme to detect Sybil attacks in VANETs. This approach takes advantage of VANET tra c patterns and presence of road side base stations. This detection approach uses statistical analysis of signal strength distribution observed over a period of time for a suspect vehicle. Each vehicle plays the role of a claimer, witness and veri er at different time intervals and for di erent purposes. If the estimated positions of the claimer vehicle are far removed from the claimed positions, it is deemed a Sybil node.
Once a Sybil node is detected, the Sybil classi cation algorithm is performed to check other Sybil nodes generated by the same attacker. [15] analyze the e ectiveness of a Sybil attack, under assumptions of transmission signal tuning and antenna, and demonstrate the limitation of RSS based Sybil attack detection in VANET.
Zhou et al. [16] have proposed a privacy preserving method to detect a Sybil attack with trusted roadside boxes and pseudonyms. A centralized unit assigns a pool of pseudonyms to all vehicles. Pseudonyms are used to generate tra c messages instead of using real identities for privacy reasons. Pseudonym belonging to a vehicle is hashed to a unique value. Vehicles can not abuse these pseudonyms for a given Sybil attack. This scheme provides privacy but it is based on the assumption that individual vehicles are registered and managed by trusted authorities. A method of detecting Sybil attack in wireless sensor network based on ranging is proposed by Ren et al. [30] . In this approach, each node nds the suspected nodes by checking the range of neighboring nodes.
Shaohe et al. [21] have proposed a cooperative RSS based Sybil attack detection for static sensor networks where all nodes-legitimate and malicious have xed transmission power. Each node overhears packets and computes its distance to other nodes using received signal strength. Each node creates a group of neighboring nodes by using similarity in RSS value and periodically broadcasts the group result. Identities with similar RSS values are grouped into a suspect group.
The approach discussed in [22, 23] uses RSUs for issuing certi cates to all passing vehicles. Since there is a difference of moving dynamics for multiple vehicles, it is very rare to have two vehicles passing by multiple RSUs at exactly the same time. Two messages will be treated as issued from the same vehicle if they have similar timestamp series issued by RSUs. This approach may lead to false positives as some vehicles may receive the same series of certi cates from the same RSU for a signi cant period of time, especially in situations where more vehicles are coming from opposite sides of the road. If this time is equal to or longer than the observation period, nodes will be falsely detected as Sybil nodes. We claim that the proposed technique is more accurate and e cient as it is based upon the verication of multiple vehicle parameters.
In our previous work [17] , we have surveyed Sybil attacks in VANET and analyzed the features of existing detection approaches. We have performed the implementation of a Sybil attack in VANET scenario and their impact on VANET performance in [18] . We have proposed two detection approaches for Sybil attack detection in [19] and [20] . Both these detection approaches use prede ned VANET features such as movement pattern (vehicles can move on the road only) and presence of xed units (RSUs) in the form of tra c and roadside lights. Our present work is an extension of [19] , with the di erence that in this paper we validate our approach in a realistic VANET scenario.
System model
In this section, we present a brief description of the VANET model, communication model, 802.11p protocol and vulnerabilities associated with a safety communication system.
. VANET model
VANET consists of two basic components: (1) Road Side Unit (RSU) and (2) On Board Unit (OBU). RSU is a xed unit and assumed to be trusted while OBUs are installed in vehicles, therefore these are mobile units. Each node in VANET consists of an EDR (Event Data Recorder), a GPS (Global Positioning System) receiver and a computing platform. The EDR is required to store information related to events received from neighboring nodes. The computing platform is used for processing data and making decisions based on tra c messages received from neighboring nodes. A conceptual VANET structure is shown in Figure 1 .
An hierarchy of central authorities (CA) is responsible for managing vehicle identities registered in a particular geographic region. Each CA is fully trusted by all parties in the system. It is assumed that CAs have su cient storage capability. In our case, RSUs are assumed to be the lowest level CA who directly connect with vehicles on the road. RSUs are connected with predecessor CAs using a wired link. Identity authentication infrastructure such as elec- tronic license plate (ELP) [2] is implemented for the whole network.
VANET can be modeled by using graph notations. The graph G = (V , E) represents a set of nodes in the Euclidean plane and the set of edges is represented by E ⊆ V . Nodes represent vehicles and RSUs while edges represent the communication links between the nodes. All vehicles are equipped with the same wireless transceiver. An edge (v i , v j ) exist between nodes v i and v j if the Euclidean distance between nodes v i and v j is less than or equal to their transmission range.
Here, POS i and POS j are positions of nodes i and j and TR is transmission range of the node. The above equation results in an undirected graph which may be connected or disconnected depending upon the distance between nodes.
. Communication model
In VANETs, both RSUs and vehicles participate in communication. VANET o ers three types of communication: (1) In-Vehicle (IV) (2) Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and (3) Vehicle to Road side unit (V2R). In-vehicle communication facilitates information exchange between di erent components of a vehicle. V2V communication allows communication between vehicles. It is used to disseminate safety and warning messages in the network. Depending upon the relative position of sender and receiver, V2V communication can be categorized into two types: single-hop and multi-hop. Safety messages are sent by local broadcast of vehicles i.e. using single-hop V2V communication. Multihop V2V communication is usually exploited for sending non-safety messages. V2R allows communication between the vehicles and RSUs. It is used to provide facilities such as Internet access and special service request.
. IEEE 802.11p protocol IEEE 802.11p ¹ is an amendment of the 802.11a standard, speci cally for wireless access in vehicular environments (WAVE). It is used to improve the performance of CSMA/CA based networks in vehicular environments. It de nes enhancements to 802.11a that are required to sup- DSRC protocol ¹ provides transmission range between 250 to 1000 meters, with data rates in 6-27 Mbps range in VANET. In an 802.11p network, synchronization depends on global time reference, such as coordinated universal time (UTC). This can be provided by a global navigation satellite system such as GPS or Galileo.
. Vulnerabilities
In VANET, propagated information is publicly available as safety messages are meant for each vehicle. The safety communication system of VANET di ers from the usual approach in information systems where some restrictions can be put to access the system. VANET vulnerabilities originate from its open nature such as: -Openness of wireless communication channel: In VANET, it is not possible to create secure boundaries. Once a malicious node is in the radio range of other nodes, it can communicate with these nodes and attempt to join the network. -Limited physical protection of nodes: It is rare to physically secure the access to vehicles as in wired networks. -Lack of centralized monitoring units: Tra c monitoring is hard to achieve in highly dynamic and large scale ad hoc networks. Misbehavior may be obfuscated by frequent benign failures in wireless networks, such as path breakages, transmissions impairments and packet dropping. -Unencrypted exchange of information: As safety messages are meant for all VANET nodes, these are sent in plaintext form. It ensures that all nodes can understand the safety message broadcast in VANET. Similarly, each node is free to send messages with any type of content.
Sybil attack and its classi cation
Due to the shared wireless medium, malicious nodes can gather identity information through passive monitoring and use this information to launch identity based spoofing attacks in VANET. A Sybil attack is an impersonation or a spoo ng attack where an attacker node illegitimately fabricates multiple identities or spoofs the identity of another node in the network, thereby creating an illusion of multiple nodes. There are various forms of impersonation attacks such as stolen identity attack, invisible node attack and Sybil attack. In a Sybil attack, the node that fabricates or spoofs the identities of other nodes is referred to as a malicious node/ Sybil attacker and the associated additional identities are referred to as Sybil nodes. Each Sybil attacker attempts to present a legitimate identity and one or more feigned identities. A typical Sybil attack is shown in Figure 2 . In this scenario, a Sybil attacker M creates an illusion of tra c congestion on the road. When an accident occurs on a highway in VANET, the rst vehicle that observes the accident sends a change route/deceleration warning message to other vehicles moving towards the location of the accident. Receivers may forward this message to warn following vehicles. This forwarding process can be intervened by Sybil nodes that choose not to forward the warning messages, thereby putting the life of passengers in danger.
VANET functionality can be disrupted by signi cantly increasing the number of Sybil attackers and feigned identities used by attackers. Sybil attacker creates a number of Sybil nodes depending on the communication, storage and computation resources of the attacker. There is no restriction on the procurement of these resources on nodes in VANET, therefore they are more vulnerable towards the Sybil attack.
A Sybil attacker can harm the VANET by performing one or more of the following operations :--Drop packets: An attacker may drop all warning packets in the presence of an accident. -Insert wrong information or modify existing packets: An attacker may create an illusion of a tra c jam before selecting an alternate route to its advantage. -Replay packets: An attacker may fraudulently repeat or delay normal data transmission in VANET.
A Sybil attack can be classi ed into three categories based on the following three orthogonal dimensions: type of communication, the mode of acquiring Sybil identity and their participation in the network [6, 7] as shown in Figure 3 . These categories are brie y discussed below. In the worst case, a Sybil attacker can create an unlimited number of Sybil identities using only one malicious device and participate in the network using all these Sybil identities simultaneously.
- Whenever an attacker node sends a beacon packet to announce itself, it randomly inserts an identity either from set V or NV. Apart from itself, the attacker may use all the Sybil identities simultaneously (Simultaneous Sybil attack) or in succession (Non-simultaneous Sybil attack) rather than using its real ID.
Simulation and consequence of sybil attack on VANET performance
Many VANET safety applications can be achieved by providing timely information to drivers moving on the road. This is done by a periodic exchange of safety messages (beacons) to near-by nodes. Periodic safety messages do not need expensive encryption/decryption operations. VANET applications do not require any routing protocol for sending safety/warning messages. Usually, the nodes that receive safety messages broadcast these to their neighboring nodes by a broadcasting mechanism. Each node's Internet protocol (IP) address serves as its unique identi er. Therefore, a Sybil attack with simultaneous for t = ts to te do if Attacker is simultaneously using its Sybil identities then for k = to L do if Attacker is using stolen identity then X = random(V) else X = random(NV) end if A j uses identity X to launch attack. end for else if Attacker is using stolen identity then X = random(V) else X = random(NV) end if A j uses identity X to launch attack. end if end for end for multiple identities can be prevented because the IP address of each node is unique throughout the entire network. However, an IP address can be changed as long as there is no con ict. So, a Sybil attack with multiple fake identities (used one at a time) is still possible. A frequent change of IP address may cause a routing table attack. We consider the impact of various forms of Sybil attack on the application layer as multiple identities can be shown simultaneously on the application layer unlike the network layer.
. Experimental setup
This section describes various parameters and performance metrics used in our simulation. We conducted our experiments using a NCTUns-5.0 simulator [24] , which provides an integration of the network and tra c simulation platform. This simulator provides multiple features such as road network simulation, communication and network protocol simulation, vehicular tra c simulation and feedback loop among vehicles. In our simulation experiments, we used 1, 10 and 20 Sybil attackers in the chosen Vehicular Network of 100 nodes. These attackers are selected randomly for each experiment. Attackers create Sybil identities by randomly spoo ng identities of other nodes in the network or by fabricating fake identities. A Sybil attacker may harm the network by fabricating fake safety messages, tampering messages etc. We applied a widely used radio propagation model, shadowing model [25, 28, 30] to consider the multi-path propagation e ects of a real world communication system.
We performed the implementation of Sybil attacker nodes in the simulator as follows. Whenever an attacker node sends a beacon packet to announce its ID and position, it randomly selects an ID on the eld and associates the new ID to the beacon packet (rather than applying its real ID). Whenever an attacker receives any safety message, it drops such packets. In our experiments, we performed the simulation on a two-direction 3 km highway with multi lanes in each direction. The average speed range is set between 10-50 m/s, tra c arrival rate is 500 vehicles/hour and transmission range is set to 250 meters. Each simulation case has a varied number of Sybil attackers. In our experiments, 3-5 Sybil identities are associated with each Sybil attacker. The number of Sybil attackers and its associated Sybil identities used in each experiment vary based on the type of attack. In order to evaluate the impact of node mobility on VANET performance, we varied the speed of nodes for each experiment. The simulation time is 2000 seconds. Each experiment was run 7-10 times with a di erent seed value to achieve a higher con dence level.
. Impact of di erent forms of Sybil attackers on VANET performance
We have evaluated VANET performance in terms of average packet delivery ratio and average vehicle speed. Packet delivery ratio is de ned as the ratio of the number of packets received over the number of packets transmitted by the senders. We have also calculated the average speed of all vehicles involved in the simulation. We determine the impact of a variable number of position forging attackers on average vehicle speed. Three attack scenarios are considered. In the rst scenario, we consider a single Sybil attacker while other two scenarios contain 10 and 20 attackers respectively. We implemented these attacks with varying vehicle mobility as well. Due to the high mobility of nodes, the duration of links established between nodes is typically short. Therefore, high speed of vehicles adversely a ects the performance of VANET. Figure 4 is the result of two overlapping e ects (varied number of Sybil attackers and varied mobility). A Sybil attacker is implemented according to the attack model dened in Section 4. According to this model, an attacker node can create multiple virtual IDs or spoof IDs of existing nodes and all these IDs participate simultaneously. Figure 4 illustrates that packet delivery ratio reduces more in the case that involves 20 attackers as compared to the case with 10 attackers. We observe that the average packet delivery ratio decreases even without the e ect of a Sybil attack. This reduction is due to an increase in the average speed of vehicles and packet collisions in wireless networks. This gure illustrates that in the case of one Sybil attacker, the packet delivery ratio is not a ected as much as when compared to the case of 10 and 20 Sybil attackers. Figure 5 shows the di erence in impact of a Sybil attack on average packet delivery ratio when all the Sybil IDs created by an attacker participate simultaneously or in succession in the network. A simultaneous Sybil attack causes greater reduction in average packet delivery ratio as compared to a non-simultaneous Sybil attack. This is because the number of packet collisions in a simultaneous Sybil attack is greater as compared to the latter case. In this case, we consider 10 Sybil attackers.
We also implement a Sybil attack where an attacker fabricates multiple fake identities and participates in the network on behalf of these identities. In this case, the total number of nodes increases signi cantly and this may create an illusion of tra c congestion on the road. On the other hand, if the attacker spoofs the identity of neighboring node, the total number of nodes will remain the same throughout the simulation. In this case as well, we considered 10 Sybil attackers. As shown in Figure 6 , packet deliv- ery ratio decreases more for fabricated Sybil attack. This is due to the fact that the number of nodes trying to access the shared channel increases in Sybil attack with fabricated identities and a greater number of packets collide due to the limitations of a shared wireless channel. Figure 7 illustrates the impact of a varying number of Sybil identities created by attackers on the average vehicle speed in VANET. A larger number of attackers decreases the average vehicle speed. All nodes, receiving the same message from a signi cantly large number of nodes, slow down their speed due to an illusion of a congestion on a nearby road.
Proposed detection methodology
In our proposed methodology, RSUs play a major role in Sybil attack detection. It is assumed that the detection process is applied at the RSU end. This may not be an unreasonable assumption due to the presence of RSUs across the network and their trustworthiness. In our proposed detection approach, the Sybil attacker uses the same identities over the entire observation period. This is also a genuine assumption because most VANET applications work using a reputation scheme. However a Sybil attacker that suspects being monitored, will try a variety of actions to evade the detection process. The attacker might use different identities at di erent time intervals. But in this scenario, the purpose of Sybil attacker would fail as VANET applications work upon the acceptance of particular information from several vehicles. Our approach is based on the calculation and storage of some parameters at the RSU end after receiving the beacon packets from passing-by vehicles. These parameters are < Vehicle-ID, Timestamp, distance, RSS, Angle >. Sybil attacker tries to keep all its Sybil identities indistinguishable from legitimate identities in the system. However, there are certain di erences between Sybil nodes and legitimate nodes in VANET scenario. Legitimate nodes are free to move independently, whereas all the identities of a single Sybil attacker are bound to a single physical node, hence they have the same values for these parameters. The following subsections describe various operations performed by RSUs in order to detect Sybil nodes.
. Gathering the beacon packets from vehicles
Each vehicle on the road broadcasts beacon packets periodically to other nodes in its communication range. The frequency of the transmitted packets is 3-10 packets/second. The structure of a beacon packet is shown in Figure 8 . Every vehicle knows its GPS position. The functionality of estimation of di erent parameters and their veri cation for all the passing by vehicles is assigned only to RSUs as they are assumed to be trusted and their positions are xed. Even though neighboring vehicles that receive beacon packets can calculate the values of di erent parameters, it is a time consuming process due to limited resources. Morever, the large number of broadcasts required for veri cation can overload the shared wireless channel.
. Measurement of distance and angle of vehicles
Whenever a RSU receives a beacon packet from all passing vehicles, it calculates the distance and angle of the vehicle with reference to its own position by using the information present in the beacon packet and signal strength of received beacon packet. Each RSU also calculates the difference between the received signal strength (RSS) of the received beacon packet and estimated signal strength by the claimed position of vehicle. If this di erence is significant, the vehicle is suspected to be malicious. Therefore, each RSU calculates and stores the distance and angle of all vehicles passing across them in the format as depicted in Figure 9 . Table 1 describes the di erent parameter values that are calculated and stored by each RSU as the vehicles pass through it. We compare our technique with the approach suggested by Chen [23, 29] in which, RSUs issue certi cates (RSU i , t) to all vehicles passing them. Here, RSU i is i th RSU and t is the time of issuing the certi cate. In their approach, legitimate vehicles that receive the same certi cate at almost the same time from a RSU for some signi cant period of time, longer than the observation period, get falsely marked as Sybil nodes. For example, if the communication range is high (1Km) and two vehicles having the same speed are coming from opposite directions, signatures issued to both vehicles would be the same for a particular period of time. In a scenario where the observation period is short (say 15 seconds), both vehicles would be falsely considered as Sybil nodes if they are moving with a speed of 50km/h towards each other. These vehicles remain in the range of RSU (500 meter) for almost 60 seconds. This approach may produce incorrect results, thereby causing major damage in VANET based time critical applications. An attacker that broadcasts a bogus warning message needs to be detected in a reasonably short duration of time. In our proposed approach, two vehicles will have di erent distances and angles even if they are moving with the same speed from opposite directions. A combination of multiple parameters used to di erentiate between legitimate and Sybil nodes makes our detection approach e cient and accurate.
. In our example scenario, the vehicle V fabricates two identities for broadcasting malicious information in the network (refer Figure 10) . From Table 1 , we analyze that di erent parameter values of vehicles V , V and V remain the same for a signi cant period of time. Even some honest nodes show the same values of parameters < Distance, RSS > w.r.t. a RSU. As is evident from Table 1 , such nodes can be di erentiated using the angle parameter. On the other hand, if the angle of the two nodes is the same, the distance and RSS values are used to di erentiate the nodes. This behavior is illustrated in Figure 11 . Usage of multiple parameters makes our scheme more e cient, accurate and robust.
. Identi cation and grouping of the Sybil nodes
All Sybil nodes having the same parameter values (same motion trajectory) are placed in the same group. In this manner, the number of groups equals to the total number of Sybil attackers that create Sybil nodes in the network. If there are 4 Sybil attackers, the group G has 4 sub-groups. For example, these are {V , V , V }, {V , V }, {V , V }, {V , V }. If two sub-groups intersect, they are combined together in a single sub-group like {V , V , V }. All Sybil nodes in the group G are discarded from the vehicular communication system and their credentials are dismissed by a centralized authority. Such information related to black-listed nodes is propagated to the entire network. 
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Experimental results of proposed detection methodology
In order to evaluate the proposed detection mechanism, we used a microscopic vehicular tra c simulator [26] that is based on the real road maps of Switzerland. This simulator contains a 24 hours car tra c trace le for 260000 vehicles in an area of around 250 km X 260 km. These traces are obtained from a multi-agent microscopic tra c simulator (MMTS). This simulator provides a realistic simulation for public and private tra c over real road maps of Switzerland. Vehicle mobility is modeled by MMTS using the behavior of people living in the area within a period of 24 hours. This trace le contains the position and speed of all vehicles at each interval of time.
We have evaluated our detection approach by using only 10000 nodes in a 634km road segment from these traces. We placed 1000 RSUs at certain positions so that they can cover this area in order to apply our detection approach in a realistic scenario. We made similar assumptions as considered by authors in [11, 13, 14, 27] . All vehicles including malicious ones have the same transmission power. This is a reasonable assumption as the transmission power of each vehicle is xed by the vehicular communication standard. The beacon time interval is 3-5 packets per second.We assume that there is no hardware device tampering Sybil attackers. It is also assumed that there is no collusion among multiple Sybil attackers to successfully launch a collusion attack. In a collusion attack, these attackers may need to travel together and this may make the task of the attacker di cult and improve rate of detection. We applied a widely used radio propagation model, the shadowing model [25] It is a log normal random variable i.e measured in dB (of Gaussian distribution). The complete shadowing model is represented as :
where, d is the reference position and d is distance between RSU and passing by vehicles. In our case, the reference position is the position of RSU involved in the detection process . X dB is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and standard deviation σS dB .
. Simulation results
Di erent parameters, such as, duration of observation period (in which reasonable beacon packets are received from passing-by vehicles) and relative speed of Sybil nodes must be determined for e ective working of detection approach. These parameters vary depending on the environment conditions of an individual network. In our proposed approach, a series of experiments are run to derive accurate values of these parameters that provide a high detection accuracy with minimum error rate. The simulation results are evaluated using metrics like Detection Rate (DR) and False Positive Rate (FPR). These metrics are computed using True Positive (TP) Figure 12 shows that the detection delay increases as the number of Sybil attackers increase. We evaluated the detection time for two transmission range cases: (1) 500m and (2) 1000m. Since detection delay depends on the number of nodes covered within the transmission range, it is expected that an increase in the range of transmissions will decrease the detection time. The required observation period is longer in the case of a 500 meter transmission range because a lower number of vehicles will be recorded by RSUs as compared to 1000 meters transmission range case. We evaluated the detection rate and false positive rate for our Sybil attack detection approach. Detection rate is de ned as the percentage of Sybil nodes detected out of the total number of Sybil nodes in VANET. Figure 13 shows that the detection rate in our approach increases as the observation period increases. As can be seen in Figure 13 , observation periods of 25s and 45s are needed for achieving high accuracy at transmission ranges of 1000m and 500m respectively. The duration of this observation period is quite large as compared to the observation period of our previous work [18] . This is due to the dynamic behavior of vehicles regarding their movement and larger inter-RSUs distance. Figure 14 illustrates the variance of the percentage false positive rate over relative speed. Relative speed is dened as the speed di erence of a Sybil node and a nearby normal node.
If the path trajectory of a normal node remains very close to the trajectory of a malicious node for a signicant period of time, it is considered as a Sybil node. This is due to the limited accuracy of the channel and is known as a false positive. If the relative speed between a legitimate and Sybil node is zero, the false positive rate is 100%. As the di erence between speeds of legitimate and Sybil node increases, false positive rate decreases. Some Sybil attackers may not be detected as they have a shorter lifetime as compared to the observation period. When the speed di erence is 8m/s, our proposed approach is able to accurately di erentiate between Sybil nodes and legitimate nodes (moving close to each other) when transmission range equals 500 and 1000m.
Discussion
In this section, we brie y analyse the proposed approach in di erent scenarios. We have analyzed the memory, communication and computation time requirement of the proposed scheme. We also discuss the comparison of the proposed approach with other Sybil attack detection mechanisms.
. Analysis of proposed scheme
Transmission power of a sender node determines the reception area of transmitted beacon packets. Di erent activities can interfere with the transmission range of a node. For example, if two nodes are separated by an obstacle, transmitted messages are received with a weak propagation signal. A Sybil attacker can spoof the transmission power while sending the beacon packets. We discuss the applicability of the proposed approach in various types of transmission range scenarios. In the case where a Sybil attacker uses static transmission power for broadcasting beacon packets, the proposed approach successfully locates the Sybil nodes orginated by an attacker. All Sybil identities originated by a malicious node are observed with the same values of various parameters for the duration of the observation period.
In case of spoofed transmission power, an attacker may increase/decrease the transmission power as compared to xed transmission power of legitimate nodes. Since, the transmission power of all Sybil identities associated with the attacker is assumed to be same (it may be different from the transmission power of legitimate nodes), the proposed scheme gives accurate results as all Sybil identities have the same values of various parameters.
However, a Sybil attacker that uses dynamic transmission power while broadcasting the beacon packets using di erent Sybil identities is of limited interest for an attacker as proved by Gutte et al. [15] . This is due to the fact that increased transmission power increases the area of a successful attack, as well as the area of reception (more number of nodes can receive the packet). If the receiver nodes are legitimate, they can easily detect an increase in attacker's transmission power. Therefore, an increase in transmission power increases the probability of attack detection, decreases the severity of an attack and is harmful for the attacker as well. An attacker needs to tune its transmission power in such a way that signal attenuation can be compensated. However, that is not easy to implement. Decreasing the transmission power of an attacker has a minor impact on VANET applications also as it leads to fewer victim nodes. Use of dynamic transmission power in broadcasting the beacon packet is of limited interest for an attacker.
A Sybil attacker may broadcast beacon packets with dynamic transmission power using di erent Sybil identities at di erent time intervals (also known as ON/OFF attack). The proposed approach is inappropriate for scenario of ON/OFF transmission power attack. This attack case may be resolved by estimating sender position. For example, a Sybil attacker V creates two sybil vehicles V and V . P (t ) · · · P (tn) P (t ) · · · P (tn) are the sequences of estimated positions of V and V over the observation period for an observer (in our scenario, the RSU).
The di erence in a series of estimated positions of an attacker and its Sybil identities follows a normal distribution with zero mean. In this manner, Sybil nodes originated from the same malicious node may be identi ed. If a Sybil attacker uses existing node identities, our detection approach requires a long observation period. Some RSUs have multiple entries for a node with di erent values of parameters at the same point of time i.e. they show invalid results. Computation overhead is more for detecting this type of attack by the proposed detection method.
. Overheads
We perform an analysis of time, space and communication requirements in our proposed detection approach. where N i is number of vehicles in the range of RSU R i , σ is the time threshold i.e. maximum duration for which each RSU has to store the record of its neighboring vehicles and n is the total number of RSUs observing the tra c patterns of vehicles on the road. Therefore, the memory space requirement for each RSU depends on the number of vehicles in its vicinity. After the threshold value (σ) is passed, the space required in one beacon interval is released from RSUs. -Computation time required: We perform a series of experiments on realistic tra c data to evaluate that threshold (σ) of 25 seconds is required to di erentiate legitimate and Sybil nodes in a 500 meter transmission range. Similarly, the value of σ is 45 seconds in the case the transmission range of vehicles is 1000 meter. Actual computation time required to detect Sybil nodes is (σ + t decision + t report ). Apart from σ, it considers the decision and report time required to announce other nodes in the network. Computation time increases with an increase in the number of vehicles. -Communication overhead: It is computed by comparing the number of transmissions made by the proposed scheme as compared to the base system. For security sensitive applications, a 50% communication overhead is acceptable. As per our proposed approach, the communication overhead includes only the number of broadcast packets that are created to report other nodes about the Sybil nodes.
. Comparison
We compare our experimental results with other Sybil attack detection schemes.
-The approach used in [14] is based on position veri cation whereas in our approach, we verify the similarity of vehicle parameters. Apart from this, our scheme is lightweight in terms of the computation overhead as we group nodes based on similar values of various parameters in contrast to the mentioned scheme where position of each received beacon packet is estimated. Their approach uses collaboration of multiple vehicles, where each vehicle on the road detects a Sybil vehicle and exchanges its observations with neighboring vehicles, thereby leading to a computational overhead. All approaches which require the collaboration of neighboring nodes have the risk of malicious node penetration. Some approaches make unrealistic assumptions regarding the presence of legitimate neighboring vehicles around the Sybil attacker. Also, illegitimate nodes can interrupt the Sybil attack detection process and deteriorate the network performance. In our proposed approach, attack detection is implemented independently by RSUs (that are assumed trusted), which makes our approach robust. In the proposed detection approach, a signi cantly high detection rate is achieved with an observation period of 25 seconds and a transmission range of 500 meters. Small values of relative speed can increase false detection rate as two vehicles moving side by side may be detected as Sybil nodes. The proposed approach is able to detect all Sybil nodes that originate from the same attacker. It shows signi cantly accurate results even in realistic scenario. The approach discussed in [14] does not consider the realistic VANET scenario for its evaluation. They have not even mentioned the experimental setup or number of nodes for the experiment. -We also compare the proposed approach with [23] , that also leverage the presence of RSUs on roadsides. Each RSU issues certi cates to all vehicles passing them. It is very rare for two vehicles to pass multiple RSUs at exactly the same time because of a di erence in their moving dynamics. Two nodes can be considered Sybil if they have a similar timestamp series issued by RSUs. This approach may result in false detection as some vehicles may receive the same series of certi cates from the same RSU for a signi cant duration of time. For example, in situations where vehicles come from opposite sides, they have the same series of timestamps for a substantial period of time. If this duration is equal to or longer than the ob-servation period, nodes will falsely be detected as Sybil nodes. This approach is evaluated for 200 nodes using RT mobility model ( m × m).
Detection accuracy is 99% and error rate is 1%. Our proposed approach is based upon the veri cation of multiple parameters in a realistic scenario, which makes our scheme more accurate and efcient. Our scheme shows 100% accuracy (with Relative speed 8 m/s). However, smaller values of relative speed can increase false detection rate as two vehicles moving side by side may be detected as Sybil nodes. To remove this confusion, detection rate is analyzed by varying the length of the observation period. Also the use of multiple parameters makes our approach more e cient and accurate. -In the pseudonym based Sybil attack detection approach [15] , department of motor vehicles (DMV) creates enough of a pool of pseudonyms for each vehicle based on coarsegrained and ne-grained hash functions. RSUs detect the potential Sybil attack by monitoring aforementioned hash functions. In this approach, DMV may become bottlenecked when creating pseudonyms for a large number of vehicles on the road. This approach was implemented in NS2 simulator for 120 nodes and accuracy and error rate of detection approach was not discussed in the paper. -In RSS variation based Sybil attack detection approach [32] , received signal strength (RSS) variations are used to verify the authenticity of communicating nodes according to their localizations. They have demonstrated through geometric analysis that veri er nodes can determine the presence of Sybil nodes within VANET. Implementation and evaluation of this approach was not discussed in the paper. -The approach discussed in [35] also uses RSUs to implement privacy-based Sybil attack detection. They also used pseudonymless beaconing to preserve privacy. Tamper resistant module (TRM) is employed to verify periodically sent beacon packets and RSUs are used to verify event reporting messages (ERM). RSUs collect ERMs for events and more than one ERM for the same event having an identical token signi es the presence of malicious nodes in VANET. The proposed approach discussed in our paper is similar to it in respect of veri cation, but parameters (time-stamp, position and RSS etc.) used for veri cation are different in our approach. In our approach RSUs are not sending tokens to passing vehicles. In fact, vehicles send small beacon packets to RSUs and after receiving these packets, RSUs verify by exchanging the information with neighboring RSUs. The approach [35] uses only single RSU to detect Sybil attack whereas veri cation by more than one RSU make our approach more accurate and ecient. Also, simulation results considering parameters (RSU placements, observation period and relative speed of vehicles) are also presented in a realistic mobility scenario. Comparison of the proposed detection approach with existing Sybil attack detection methodologies for VANET scenario is shown in Table 2 . When comparing with previous Sybil attack detection schemes, our proposed scheme has considered additional parameters: (1) Simulation and evaluation in realistic mobility scenario (2) Evaluation of proposed approach considering parameters (RSU placements, observation period and relative speed of vehicles) and (3) veri cation of multiple parameteres as discussed in Section 6. Attackers whose attack duration is shorter than σ may not be detected by the proposed approach. However, Sybil attacks of short duration do not intensely impact making any incorrect decisions. The proposed approach is able to detect all Sybil nodes originated from the same attacker, but in small scale networks, it gives more false positives.
Conclusion
VANETs are more vulnerable to di erent types of misbehaviors due to physical characteristics of environment and nodes used in wireless communication. Sybil attack in VANET is the root cause of all other types of VANET attacks. In this paper, we implemented various forms of Sybil attacks in VANET and analyzed the impact of Sybil attack on VANET performance in terms of packet delivery ratio and average vehicle speed. We have analyzed that VANET performance degrades more in a scenario where a Sybil attacker participates in the network using all its fabricated Sybil identities simultaneously as compared to other forms of Sybil attack. We have proposed a distributed detection approach based on the veri cation of multiple factors. Each RSU independently performs Sybil attack detection by comparing values of di erent vehicle parameters at 
